This study examines whether players benefit from free agency or not. In professional sports, free agency has been a hot topic in recent years. Based on a bargaining model with arbitrary bargaining power, we found that players who have a relative smaller bargaining power to their owners still get lower payoffs after the implement of free agency, and vice versa. Moreover, the expected payoffs of players and sports teams are both not influenced by free agency.
Introduction
is the first one who uses economic analysis to discuss the impact of transfer restrictions and free agency on professional sports. He finds that players benefit from free agency to get reasonable salaries, but players get lower salary than their marginal productivity under transfer restrictions. (Note 1) However, Feess and Muehlheusser (2003) show that sports teams lose their wants to nurture talents because of free agency.
Free agency sounds good to players, however, some scholars have different thoughts. Dietl et al. (2008) point out that players loss the profits which come from transfer restrictions, so they use a new analysis method -risk allocation. Because of uncertainty and short athletic career, players prefer cash to the possibility of future high payment. However, sports teams don't sign any insured contract because they don't know players' future performances. Only transfer restrictions can make sports teams pay higher. In other words, free agency destroys players' benefits. This paper is based on Dietl et al. (2008) , (Note 2) but we don't consider the situation of risk-averse. Besides, we don't assume that players have the same bargaining power to sports teams because in reality different sports teams and players have different bargaining power. Therefore, we put stress on bargaining power. It means sports teams get higher revenue if they have bigger bargaining power and vice versa. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is basic model and Section 3 is the analyses of the transfer with transfer restrictions and free agency. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 4.
Basic Model
In this paper, we discuss how free agency makes influence to players and baseball teams. We apply game theory model established by Dietl et al. (2008) . Let P denote player and S and L symbolize two sports teams -S is a small team and L is a large team. We assume that there are only two periods, (Note 3) in period 1 player P can sign a contract with S or L and then in the end of period 1 P become a free agent. To avoid moral hazard, we assume that players' performances are random exogenous variables. Besides, player's utility comes from his/her salary and sports teams' utility come from the sum of their players' performances deduct the salary they pay. In the begin of every period, players make a bargain with sports teams which is based on their past performances. We have to know when players first come into professional sports market, their abilities 0 e are well known to all sports teams. That's because every sports team has scout ; therefore, . Therefore, we know that players who perform well in period 1 should stay in big team in period 2 and vice versa. Based on former assumption, next chapter we discuss two situations of transfer: in section 3.1 is under transfer restrictions and in section 3.2 is under free agency.
Comparisons between Transfer Restrictions and Free Agency

Transfer Restrictions
We use Nash bargaining as the model of bargaining between players and sports teams. In period 1, players and sports teams use threat point to negotiate. Besides, all people know the rule that is when the contracts terminate all players' need their original teams' permission to transfer to the other team.
Using Nash bargaining, we have to know players and sports teams' total expected payoffs. In period 1 player P 
In period 2, expected payoffs that team S can get is the transfer fee
In period 2, team L 's expected payoffs are:
On the other hand, when player P acts well in period 1, he will still stay at team S . Therefore, we'd better use Nash bargaining to discuss player P 's salary To sum up, we can get:
That is, player P can get the salary   
To here, we can calculate the player P and sports teams' total utility. (1 )
Player P ' s total expected utility is the sum of salary:
(1 )
Using the information mentioned above, we can use Nash bargaining to calculate unknown 
Differentiate equations（5）and（6）we can get:
Put all information into equations (7) and (8) 
Condition 2：Signing contract with team
L in period 1.
We use the same way in condition 1 to get unknown variables. 
When player P still stay at team L in period 2, the expected payoffs of player P and team L are:
Therefore, under transfer restrictions the total expected utility of team L and player P are:
We can get the unknown variable 
Free Agency
When free agency comes out, we still use Nash bargaining to discuss salary bargaining. But now it's different with section 3.1. player P and the original team both can't make sure that player P will stay in period 2 or not; therefore, the expected utility of Nash bargaining only relates to period 1. In period 2 we can still use Nash bargaining because the situation is the same with period 1. Therefore, no matter 0 t  or 1 t  , we all use Nash bargaining to discuss salary bargaining, the formula just as follows:
, 1 argmax 0
No matter team S or L , the expected utility is player P 's expected performance deducts the salary. Take team S as example, expected utility is
. Besides, if sports teams can't sign contract with any player, they will get nothing, so the threat point is 0 .
On the other hand, the expected utility of player P is the salary he gets. Therefore, if the bargaining fails, player P still can sign contract with the other team, so his/her threat point is the salary that he can get from the other team ,1
Put all information into equation (9) and (10), we can get that player P 's salary in team S and team L are:
Under the conditions we mentioned above, we discuss two situations of different contract signing.
Condition 1：Signing contract with team S in period 1.
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Using equation (11), we get the player P 's salary in period 1:
According to player P 's performance in period 1, he has probability q to act well and then he will transfer to
Now, because of free agency, team S will get nothing and team L 's expected payoffs are:
On the other hand, player P 's performance in period 1 has probability 1 q  to act badly and then he will stay at team S . In this situation, profits of player P and team S are:
,2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1
To sum up, under condition 1, the total expected utility of team S is expected payoffs 
Condition 2：Signing contract with team L in period 1.
Using equation (12) 
When player
P still stay at team L , the expected payoffs are:
By using the same way with condition 1, we can get the total expected utility of team L and player P are:
Comprehensive Analysis
Summarize section 3.1 and section 3.2, the results are table 1 and table2: 
Under condition 2, we can summarize as table 3 and 4: 
According to the information in table 3 and 4, we can get the utility change of player P , team S and team L 11 when free agency comes out:
Using the given values above and the information in section 3.2, we can get the results in table 5:   , that is, the bargaining power of the original team is bigger than players, we found that, to team S or L ,the utility all bigger than 0 when free agency comes out. In other words, when the sports team is the leader in salary bargaining, even free agency comes out can't lower their profits. On the other hand, when players' bargaining power is smaller than sports teams, players are still followers even under free agency. The result we get just the same as Dietl et al. (2008) .
On the contrary, when 1/ 2   , players become leaders in salary bargaining. It's the same with Rottenberg (1956) and Muehlheusser (2003) .
In proposition 1, we found that bargaining power influences on players and sports teams'utility change under free agency. Therefore, we get the same results with past papers. In reality, the bargaining power of sports teams usually bigger than players, therefore, free agency benefits sports teams rather than players.
[Proposition 2] Free agency is a Zero-Sume Game.
Sum the utility in table 5, condition 1 and 2, we can get 0, that is, free agency is a Zero-Sum Game. In other words, free agency can't create more value.
[Proposition 3] The utility change doesn't relate to players' abilities.
According to condition 1 and 2, we found that under different contract signing situations we can get the same utility change. In other words, players' abilities and signing contract with whom in period 1 don't influence utility change. 
